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INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the use of artificial life metaphors in providing a context for cognition and affect and provides a discourse on the possibilities offered by artificial life for modeling aspects of cognition, specifically drives and motivations. It is suggested that these phenomena will have an important part to play in the future of agent software engineering as a means for bridging the conceptual gap between agent autonomy and agent benevolence. In this research the term agent is placed in a broader perspective than the current trend in agent-oriented software (Ciancarini & Wooldridge, 2001; Ferber, 1999) , relating to the use of agent in, for example, cognitive science (Wilson & Keil, 1999) and philosophical works (Ryle, 1949) . A relatively simple a-life scenario is used to demonstrate the relation between theoretical concepts in the research areas of In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 3 cognition and affect and computational architectures. The paper highlights a design methodology that allows incremental agent sophistication to be achieved. These explorations and designs make use of the SIMAGENT toolkit -an agent-based toolkit that runs in the Poplog environment.
This chapter describes a framework used to investigate cognitive agent architectures. The framework is a synthesis of a number of approaches and aims to provide a means to map abstract theory to well-defined implementation. Influences include the control state approach to cognition (Simon, 1967; Sloman, 1993) , the niche and design space perspective on mind (Davis, 2001b) , the broad but shallow perspective to agent development of the CMU OZ project (Bates et al, 1991) and the architectural parsimony of Hayes-Roth (1993) . It makes use of logic and finite models (including cellular automata) to specify process and behaviour in an agent.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This research pursues the following three major objectives:
• A synthesis of concepts for studying cognitive agents based on an analysis and investigation of how different perspectives on emotion, motivation and autonomy map onto computational frameworks.
• A framework for developing rules on how artificial life and emergent behaviours can be combined with the more abstract decision making processes associated with cognitive agents.
• Insights into the nature of heterogeneous mechanisms across different processing, representational and knowledge levels, and their explanatory role in describing mental phenomena.
In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 4 There are controversies about the terminology used in this area of cognitive science research.
Motivation, drive, goal and emotion are used to refer to and mean a number of different things.
There is no universal definition of these terms across (or even within) the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Some (Ortony et al, 1988; Frijda, 1986) consider emotions to be a cognition centred set of phenomena, while others (Frankel & Ray, 2001; Chapman, 1996) consider these terms to be centred on low-level (neuro-/physiological) control processes that affect cognition. These arguments are not addressed in depth hereresearch on emotion is discussed elsewhere (Davis 2001a ). However such terms will be defined in the following sections as required and used to refer to specific phenomena pertinent to this work.
Other major controversies relate to the question of whether a-life entities can be said to be alive or mere process simulacra? (Boden, 1996) . These controversies are akin to the arguments about the nature of intelligence and how best to investigate, design and implement it (Brooks, 1991; VanLehn, 1991; Wilson & Keil, 1999) . A fundamental issue is the difference between Cartesian and biological based cognitive science (Wheeler, 1997) . From a Cartesian point of view the rules governing physical bodies and those affecting psychological phenomena are distinct and noninteracting -mind is separate to body. From the biological-based view of cognitive science such a distinction cannot be made. The question then arises that if by using synthetic agents in synthetic environments are we in fact studying synthetic minds which are as alien to those associated with biological entities as silicon is to carbon (Davis, 1998) ? In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 5 The research described here makes extensive use of computational design and experimentation.
BACKGROUND
In moving from theoretical perspectives to alternative designs and then to possible computational models, some research questions are answered without requiring implementation. This is termed the design stance. What is typical of this approach is that in moving though these different levels, flaws in our understanding are revealed and insights into the nature of our research questions compounded by further questions. Beyond the designs, alternative implementations are possible.
Often it is the case that what might seem trivial at the theoretical level is complex at the implementation level, even in shallow experiments. This is in part analogous to the challenges presented by agents to orthodox software engineering. Agent technology is advancing fast with an associated increase in the software engineering perspectives appropriate to building agent systems (Ciancarini & Wooldridge, 2001 ). For some well defined applications, for example ecommerce (Luo et al, 2002) , it is possible to combine knowledge engineering principles (Scheiber et al, 1993) with toolkits (Nwana et al, 1999 ) that extend object-oriented software engineering techniques to encompass aspects of agent programming. However for more investigative experimentation with ill-defined concepts, as investigated here, there is a shortage of easily manipulable toolkits. The agent toolkits that do exist for such work, for example SIMAGENT (Sloman & Logan, 1998) , require advanced programming capabilities and prolonged and frequent use to achieve results acceptable to the research community. However they do provide a high-level departure point for experimentation into agent architectures and parameterisation.
A number of problem domains and test-beds have been used for experimental purposes. The choice of domain and test-bed is determined by the research questions to be addressed. If the In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 6 major concern is about design options and how to resolve low-level behaviours or the study of collective emergent behaviour in simple agent architectures, use is made of a number of variations on TileWorld (Hanks et al, 1993) . In studying motivation and its relation to collective activity we can use TileWorld, an artificial robot controlled factory (Davis, 1997; Davis, 2001b) or RoboCup (Nunes, 2001) . In studying the mechanisms associated with cognition and affect, there are no conclusive assumptionless analyses that invalidate this approach. On the contrary, by using simulated worlds greater progress can be made in determining which of the research issues can be tackled this way, which cannot and why that is the case. The research into computational architectures for motivation, emotion and autonomy does not require the use of robots. The behaviours, processes and information structures of interest in this research can be studied without compromise in synthetic environments. The assumption underpinning this research perspective is that these mechanisms in a synthetic mind should be inherently similar across domains, irrespective of the nature of the situated action.
Here a simple predator-prey scenario is used as an exemplar. This environment is a continuous spaced two dimensional world of objects and agents. Objects are not mobile, exist for a specified period and can be used as an energy source by some agents but act as an obstacle to others.
Agents move around in this world consuming energy. Agents can sense objects and other agents in their environment if within a specified range. This form of sensing is a simulated perceptual mechanism provided by the agent toolkit. Agents can reclaim energy by consuming specific classes of objects and if predatory, specific agent classes. Agents breed in certain conditions, the offspring being some combination of its two parents. Agents, in moving, deposit an energy trail of agent-specific RGB-valued pixels in a colour image. Agents with appropriate capabilities can
In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 7 sample and sense this colour image to provide clues to the whereabouts and nature of other agents. This use of machine vision in the agents allows us to deepen the perceptual capabilities of our agent architectures and permits explorations into sensory fusion when combined with the inbuilt sensing mechanism of the toolkit.
DESIGNS FOR MIND
CogAff (Sloman, 2001 ) is a three-column architecture of perception, central processing and action. It provides the means to investigate the modeling of mental phenomena. It consists of three-layers: reactive mechanisms which are (sometimes ballistic) behavioural responses to environmental and internal states; deliberative reasoning which requires explicit manipulation of some form of cognitive structure (for example motivational constructs); and meta-management mechanisms (reflective processes) which monitor the agent's internal state, processes and its ongoing stimulus-response arcs.
This very abstract architecture accepts perceptual information and outputs action in the environment. Alarms provide feedback from action and other intermediate stages across the three layers and columns. Personae are associated with the reflective level. As different personae become active, the control state of the entire agent changes. This affects the interpretation of incoming information and the actions of the agent in any given external situation. For example if modelling the type of visual perception described by Gibson (1986) , sensory data when perceived is given affordances and valences. An environmental event in the path of an agent will be perceived according to the nature of the current control states. Certain events may be control state neutral, others may exist in antithesis to further control states. Consider a second agent in danger and placed in front of such an agent. If the perceiving agent has adopted a selfish personae, this
In: Intelligent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova & S. Wermter, Idea Group Publishing, 2002. 8 external event will be given a negative valence and afforded avoidance behaviours. If the perceiving agent has adopted a selfless personae, this external event may be given a positive valence and afforded rescue behaviours. Some events may be completely irrelevant to the agent and are ignored or afforded neutral obstacle-avoidance behaviours. Other events may be outside of an agent's immediate repertoire of behaviours but deemed important enough to activate further deliberative processing (for example motivations).
From the control state perspective, an agent's immediate repertoire of instantiated drives and behaviours can be considered to be transient control states. Motivations are more persistent (but ultimately temporary) control states that may or may not segue well with the agent's current set of personae. Conflicts between control states can therefore emerge. An intelligent and truly adaptable and autonomous agent should be able to resolve these conflicts through internal changes. This type of phenomena is associated with emotions in human and similar affective states can be found in synthetic agents (Sloman & Croucher, 1987) . For example, an agent in need of energy but not sensing any may activate a motivator or goal to find an energy source. The behaviours required to realise this motivation may exist within the agent's overall repertoire of behaviours but be at odds with the desire or intention to explore or avoid certain aspects of the agent's environment. This state of affairs can be resolved using control state concepts, and the motivator management information used in resolving this conflict stored with the motivator. This cannot be said for most structures used for representing goals. It is possible that most agents need to resolve these sorts of conflicts and the designers do not realise that in producing such agents, they risk compromising the concept of an autonomy that underpins the agent.
At the first ATAL workshop, autonomy was defined as one of four foundations for a weak notion of agency (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995) . Autonomy was defined as operating "…without the direct intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state". Castelfranchi (1995) categorizes and discusses the various types of autonomy that a cognitive agent (or robot) can demonstrate. In particular, a distinction is drawn between belief and goal autonomy in the "Double Filter" Autonomous Architecture. If an agent is to be autonomous, then it must set and have control over its goals. External agents, whether biological or computational, should not have direct control over the setting of an agent's goals, but can only influence these through the provision of information that affects an agent's belief set. The management of belief sets is described in terms of rationality (logic based reasoning) and credibility of incoming information (sensing). An agent can only be autonomous within certain bounds. Agent autonomy can be constrained by design specifications that require the agents to pursue certain goals on behalf of their designers (agent benevolence). In sophisticated applications with agents dealing in uncertain information and multiple goals, it would seem reasonable to expect conflicts to arise from this compromise between autonomy and the pursuit of possibly incompatible goals. The more encompassing control information associated with motivations in this work may provide agent designers with a tool by which such conflicts can be resolved. Our designs for intelligent systems are such that the resulting computational system should be capable of monitoring itself and catching perturbant behaviors before they become disruptive. Furthermore an intelligent system should also be capable of recognizing and harnessing beneficial emergent behaviors.
architecture with its various modules and components cannot be designed but needs to be evolved (Husbands et al, 1993) . The central thesis to that argument is that there are so many modules with so many interconnections that it is beyond the capabilities of the human mind to design and implement. We counter this argument by adopting a distributed approach to mind. This approach has its computational roots in the early work on agents and distributed blackboard systems (Erman & Lesser, 1975) . A society of agents with specific and differing capacities and capabilities can be designed and implemented. The interactions within this society of these agents then models the interconnections thought impossible to model explicitly. The thesis central to this counter-argument is that the collective and emergent processing of a suitable designed society of specifically engineered agents will give the required overall capabilities. However it is important that such an agent community has the capability to recognise and manage its emergent behaviours. This is the line being pursued in the research described here and sketched in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. A societal approach to cognition based on the CogAff architecture
We aim to demonstrate that sophisticated cognitive behaviour can arise from the interaction of suitably designed agents in much the same way as demonstrated for socio-economics in Sugarscape (Epstein & Axtell, 1996) . The remainder of this chapter will show how to pursue a line of research into these phenomena using computational tools guided by the principles of incremental complexity and architectural parsimony. This experimentation proceeds from relatively simple, easily realised architectures through to quite complex designs.
DRIVES AND A-LIFE AGENTS
Drives are low-level, ecological, physiological and typically pre-conscious. They provide the basis for an agent's behaviour in the world, are periodic but short-lived and are defined in terms of resources essential for an agent. Such activities for information agents include the need to gather resources and propagate information to associates in their society. In biological agents such drives include thirst, hunger, and reproduction. Thresholds for the onset and satiation of such drives are variable and dependent upon processes internal to an agent and external factors arising in the agent's environment. Such drives can be modeled relatively easily in computational agents. These simple "a-life" agents then provide a theoretical and computational platform with which to explore more interesting phenomena.
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Figure 2. State Transition Diagram for Drives in the Simplest Prey Agent (Agent0)
Consider a base level agent (Agent0) with no explicit motivations but three implicit drives: the need to eat, escape predators and reproduce. Behaviours associated with these drives can be modeled using state transition diagrams as in figure 2, described using propositional calculus and implemented as an action selection architecture (Agre & Chapman, 1987) in SIMAGENT. These agents move around an environment populated with food items and other agents (we have experimented with hundreds of such agents in any one environment), some of which are predatory. The agent can sense items within a specified radius of itself, and discriminate between food, non-predatory and predatory agents. This agent is given an initial energy level and must locate food items to maintain its energy. Movement causes energy to be consumed in proportion to its velocity. When the energy level dips below a specified threshold the agent changes state (it becomes hungry) and must sense and find food. If this energy level reaches zero the agent dies. In Agent0 drives are either on or off. Drives in Agent1 makes use of signal strength based on two factors -an internal measure (energy) and an external measure (distance from some object or agent). The signal strength based on internal energy (used in the food and reproduce drive) is defined as shown in figure 3 . The signal strength associated with the Hunger drive makes use of the current energy level (E) and three thresholds as given in figure 3 . The thresholds can be optimized through experimentation and analysis and also subject to change through agent reproduction. A similar model is used for the drives associated with the agent's perception of its external environment. Again these models readily map onto the object-oriented methods and production rule capabilities of the agent toolkit.
Specific capabilities (for example perception, drive activation, drive selection and behaviour combination) are described using propositional calculus and then bundled together as rules in RS2 determines which of the agent drives can be currently active. A further ruleset (RS3)
instantiates active drives with specific values for signal strength and target locations. A fourth ruleset (RS4) selects compatible drives, and the final ruleset (RS5) maps these drives onto agent actions which are posted to the world update methods of the agent toolkit. Rulesets are bundled together as rulesystems (e.g. RuleFamily1 for Agent1) which define the information processing ontology for any particular class of agent. Alternative rulesets for any specific behaviour allow the agent to switch between alternative processing modes. Rulesets can be shared across rulesystems and more complex agents build on simpler agents by extending the rulesystem with further rulesets (e.g. RuleFamily2 in figure 4 ). 
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Figure 4. AgentWorld of Methods, Rule-Sets and Rule-Families.
Agent1 is a reactive architecture, responding to both internal and external pressures. It can make use of the same decision making mechanism as Agent0 but with the impulses (i.e. vector changes) weighted according to their signal strength. An alternative decision making mechanism is to select that impulse with the highest signal as a primary goal and then any other impulse that does not conflict with this behaviour. For this test harness all agent behaviours result in a movement in two-dimensions. Hence a conflict in behaviour is simply a vector that distracts from the direction vector of the primary goal. Again there are experimentally derived parameters that define a maximum deviation to the nominal direction vector. Agent1 displays drives, implicit goals (the nominal direction vector of the drive with strongest signal) but no explicit motivation.
Any affective qualities are an emergent property of the agent and its environment. Maundering, the switching between two goals or behaviours, is one example. Consider a simple experiment where a predominantly static predatory agent is flanked by two food items of benefit to a further agent. While the energy level of the non-predatory agent is high it will move away from the predatory agent. As the energy level drops, the signal strength to move towards a food item increases. At some point the signal strength associated with moving towards the food becomes sufficient that it is adopted as the primary goal. The agent therefore moves towards one or both of the energy sources (these are not antithetic behaviours) and hence the predatory agent. The behaviour to move away from a predator is then given a higher signal strength and the agent moves in its original direction away from the predator and hence the food. Typically the behaviour of the agent fluctuates until it runs out of energy or is consumed by the predator. If vector summation is used instead, the agent oscillates around its original position but again gradually moves towards the predator with the same result. This agent is in effect caught in a cycle of goal conflicts and maunders between acting on the flee-predator and seek-energy drives.
The agent can possibly reach the energy items through planning. A reactive planner with precompiled plans may not necessarily produce a non-direct path to the required items and may therefore result in the same behaviour as described above but at greater computational expense.
The agent needs to be able to perform planning that incorporates models of its internal states and external environment. These are deliberative processes and are associated with explicit motivations.
MOTIVATION IN COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS
Motivations are a disposition to assess situations in certain ways and involve perception of problematic events and states, representations and paths to modified states of affairs. This research (Beaudoin & Sloman, 1993; Davis, 2001b) has identified a number of subtypes.
• Goals can be of several sub-types. Quantitative goals are those talked about in control theory, and tend to involve negative feedback. Qualitative goals are the type most used in agents and involve relations, predicates, states, behaviours etc. Hybrid goals are some mix of these two;
• Attitudes are predispositions to respond or act (either internally or externally) to specific (perceptual or cognitive) cues and can involved intricate collections of beliefs, motivators and other control states, for example the selfless and selfish traits of the agents in (Davis, 1997) .
Similar control states are linked to persona in other work (Sloman, 2001 ).
• Desires relate objects, agents or events in an agent's world to plausible states of that world.
Impulses are transient desires which when acted on give rise to non-transient changes internal to the agent and/or in the external world.
Psychological definitions of emotion can be found (Wilson & Keil, 1999 ) that refer to both cognitive (appraisal) and physiological factors (reinforcers and valencing). The processes leading to the experience of emotions (in humans) are neither bottom-up nor top-down -they are both and more. Emotions are experienced as a result of the interactions within and with a synergistic information processing architecture (Davis, 2001a) . In short emotions are in part mental hybrid goals. The full motivator structure is shown in table 1. This is implemented using the object-oriented paradigm with control and support processes modeled using methods and rulesets in the SIMAGENT toolkit (rulesets RS6 and RS7 in figure 4) . Table 1 . The components associated with motivator structures.
Component Meaning Actors and Entities
Other agents (actors) and objects referenced by this motivator Belief Indicator Indication of current belief about the status of semantic content P: e.g. true, partially true, false.
Commitment Status
The current status of the motivator, e.g. adopted, rejected, undecided, interrupted, stalled, unconsidered, completed.
Decay Function
Defines how insistence decreases while motivator is not adopted.
Dynamic State
The process state of the motivator e.g. being considered, nearing completion etc.
Emotional Key
Processing keys to the emotions and their situational triggers for the motivator. Importance Value Importance (e.g. neutral, low, medium, high, unknown). This may be intrinsic or based on an assessment of the consequences of doing or not doing Insistence Value
Heuristic value determining interrupt capabilities. This should correspond to a combination of the motivator's importance and urgency. Intensity
This influences the likelihood of (continuing) to being acted on.
Management Information
The state of relevant management and meta-management processes.
Motivational Attitude
The motivator's attitude to semantic content P : make true, keep true, make false etc. Plan Set Possible plan or set of plans for achieving the motivator.
Rationale
If the motivator arose from explicit reasoning -motivators need not. Semantic Content A proposition P denoting a possible state of affairs, which may be true or false Urgency Descriptor How urgent is this descriptor -this may be qualitative (e.g. high, low) or quantitative (for example a time-cost function).
Not all the components of this computational object need to be instantiated for any specific agent class or drive type. Many of the components act as keys that influence processing elsewhere in the agent architecture of figure 1. For example the Emotion Key component can take single word values (e.g. Fear, Hate). This does not imply that emotion is a single linguistic term. Rather these linguistic keys prime and influence related processing. Therefore in this architecture emotion is a control state distributed across a number of constructs and construct handling processes and any supporting processes. Consider the maundering scenario described above. The reactive agent will either flee from the predator (Signal Strength Model) or move towards the mean position of the three entities (Behaviour Sum Model). The deliberative agent has other possibilities. Motivational structures can be instantiated that correspond to the following three drives based on figure 3:
• Flee From Predator at location(X,Y) with signal strength 0.75
• Move to Energy Source One at location(Xf1,Yf1) with signal strength 0.5
• Move to Energy Source Two at location(Xf2,Yf2) with signal strength 0.5 Table 2 gives examples of this structure as created for the Flee From Predator drive in the current situation with the initial values given in column 2. Similar structures are created for the other two (Move to Energy Source) drives. The deliberative processes associated with motivation management are initiated by an alarm call from the posting of these structures to the agent's motivator database. In this simple architecture all these motivators are given an initial appraisal, leading to the changes in value as shown in column 3 of table 2. The motivator database is then ordered on the basis of the importance value for each motivator. Importance is given a fuzzyvalued descriptor (low, medium or high) based on an appraisal of insistence, emotion key and content. In the simplest motivation architectures the top-most item from the database would be selected and plan set 5 (flee) adopted as behaviours to be activated. A more sophisticated approach can look to see how motivators can be combined, in a manner similar to goal conflation in teleo-reactive planning (Nilsson, 1994) . A planning module is used to find plans that combine plan-sets associated with pair-wise combinations of motivators. The ordering on the motivator database dictates the combination order. Motivators that can be combined are subsumed into the highest motivator with the second deleted; in an agent with a more extensive motivator management architecture, the creation of new motivators does not delete existing ones. Any change to the motivator database results in further motivator appraisal. The fourth column in table 2 shows the result of combining the Flee Predator with GoTo Energy-Source1 motivators with a suitable new plan-set. This motivator is adopted, made active and its plan set pursued as a series of movements in the environment that allow the agent to stay away from the predator but still move to and consume one of the energy sources.
Such architectures for (single) agents have been subject to research for a number of years (Beaudoin & Sloman, 1993; Davis, 1997) . A distributed version is now being re-developed based on the sketches in figures 1 and 5 (Davis, 2001b; Nunes, 2001) . This builds upon the idea of loose and tight coupling of agents as described in earlier work. Rather than build many agents each with their own motivation appraisal and management processes, agents in the same team (Nunes used five-aside-football as the application domain) initiate motivational structures which are passed to an abstract agent responsible for coordinating the motivations of alike agents. In effect agents in the same herd (or team) share the computationally expensive deliberative processing associated with motivator appraisal. There are a number of reasons why such a direction may prove beneficial. Agent communication overheads associated with motivation coordination are computationally less expensive than multiple agents each with their own motivation management capabilities. Furthermore, given that we require something other than emergent cooperation these latter agents still need to communicate with each other about their adopted motivations.
DISCUSSION
Extending the capabilities of implementations based on the earlier designs was problematic without re-engineering the entire implementation -a process which could take years. With the distributed model, extra agencies could be introduced with these further capabilities. Furthermore difficulty was experienced in introducing learning and adaptation into the design and implementation. It seemed that control mechanisms spanning the entire agent architecture would need changing. Other research has identified the same problem (Franklin, 1997) . With the distributed model specific agents can change as the overall architecture adapts. Learning associated with specific capabilities or knowledge is focussed on those agents responsible for those capabilities or knowledge. An analogy can be drawn between this model and with changes observed to classifier rules in Holland's architecture (Holland, 1975) . The distributed agent requests those elements of itself (i.e. its component agents) that are associated with the current learning task to modify themselves. Changes to the global agent are in effect mapped onto changes to agents with a specific process loci. There are many challenges to be faced with this direction.
Currently we are looking at the nature of communication between agents with shared motivations, and are using distributed blackboards (Nunes, 2001 ) as a metaphor to the global workspace theory that Baars (1988) describes. This approach is being used by others for example IDA (Franklin, 2000) . Figure 1 provides the perspective for the experiments with alternative designs for agents with the mechanisms necessary for us to address the stated research objectives.
Although (ultimately) many different agent types will be required, no single agent type will be much more complicated than that described for the right hand side of figure 5. Deliberative agents are awoken by alarms when required. In one such architecture agents develop motivator structures and pass them to a shared motivator appraiser agent. This agent has sufficient knowledge of the communicating agents that it can select motivators as appropriate. Other agents can be called on to perform specific tasks by the reactive agents or by other deliberative agents as required. The motivator appraisal described above for the maundering reactive agent could therefore be applied to many agents making use of the motivator-initiating reactive agent, one motivator appraisal agent and a planning agent.
The design philosophy described above is proving useful in developing agent applications. We are finding that developing design methodologies that can cope with the sometimes elusive concepts and ideas associated with cognitive science is of benefit to intelligent agent modeling in more constrained domains such as enterprise management (Davis, 2000) , clinical diagnosis and e-commerce (Luo et al, 2002) . The applications implemented so far are making use of what we have learnt from developing adaptive agents for cognitive science research.
The cognitively oriented software agents described in this paper are helping us understand the concepts underlying drives and motivation. We firmly believe that no matter how eloquent philosophical or psychological theories and models, the plausibility of the information processing and other mechanisms embodied in these theories can only be validated through the development of computational models. The type of experiments described here and elsewhere (Davis, 1997 (Davis, , 2001a (Davis, , 2001b Nunes, 2001 ) exemplify this approach. We have designed and implemented agents that display motivational qualities and address important questions about the nature of emotion and autonomy. Meta-agent architectures and adaptive agents provide the design and implementation tools necessary to pursue such lines of inquiry. The work in this chapter highlights the relation between agent architectures and the nature of drives and motivations. It shows that we can differentiate between drives and other forms of motivational control state at a theoretical, design and computational level. With the advent of affective computation (Picard, 1997 ) and the growing sophistication of software systems, the types of control structures discussed in this chapter may well be required in future agent applications. We have shown that agents demonstrate sometimes unwanted qualities, i.e. control dithering and maundering. We have shown that by improving the processing structures associated with drives and goals (i.e. the use of motivations), deliberative control of such emergent and affective states can be achieved.
Other experimentation has shown that oscillations in this deliberative control of emergent affective states can occur. The inclusion of the reflective (meta-agent) layer in the agent architecture provides the means to control this phenomena. Earlier it was been argued that the simple Agent0/Agent1/Agent2 architecture is capable of demonstrating affective qualities such as maundering. Such results are in agreement with other researchers (Scheutz & Sloman, 2001 ).
Now consider whether we have demonstrated emotive qualities in our research agents. Oatley and Jenkins (1996) Others, for example (Frijda, 1986) In pursuing this line of research we have found it necessary to revisit foundational principles in agent theory such as for instance autonomy, flexibility and adaptability. Domain models of autonomy sometimes raise problems in the mapping from theory to design to implementation. A domain model of autonomy in economics, social theory, cognitive science or artificial life may be at odds with or compromised by the notion of autonomy underpinning the agents in a computational toolkit. Such compromises can lead to the design of agent systems with inherent conflicts. This is an issue that needs to be addressed by research into agent software engineering.
By designing agents with the qualities described in this chapter an agent is given the means to
